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ABSTRACT
The low- and- middle- income country (LMIC) context is 
volatile, uncertain and resource- constrained. India, an 
LMIC, has put up a complex response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Using an analytic approach, we have described 
India’s response to combat the pandemic during the initial 
months (from 17 January to 20 April 2020). India issued 
travel advisories and implemented graded international 
border controls between January and March 2020. By 
early March, cases started to surge. States scaled up 
movement restrictions. On 25 March, India went into 
a nationwide lockdown to ramp up preparedness. The 
lockdown uncovered contextual vulnerabilities and 
stimulated countermeasures. India leveraged existing legal 
frameworks, institutional mechanisms and administrative 
provisions to respond to the pandemic. Nevertheless, the 
cross- sectoral impact of the initial combat was intense 
and is potentially long- lasting. The country could have 
further benefited from evidence- based policy and planning 
attuned to local needs and vulnerabilities. Experience from 
India offers insights to nations, especially LMICs, on the 
need to have contextualised pandemic response plans.
INTRODUCTION
In the absence of a specific treatment or vaccine 
for a global crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic, 
combative interventions are time- sensitive and 
resource- intensive.1 2 About 85% of the world’s 
population (6.4 of 7.6 billion, 2018) reside in 
low- and- middle- income countries (LMICs).3 
Methods such as social distancing, personal 
protection, aggressive contact tracing and 
isolation, and mass movement restriction seem 
untenable in LMIC contexts given the socio-
economic disparities and living conditions.4 
Healthcare resources are scarce and surge 
capacity weak.5 Vulnerabilities (predominance 
of unstructured employment, limited employ-
ment security and health protection, inade-
quate health awareness and care access) remain 
high and underassessed.4
With a population of ~1.4 billion, India’s 
response to COVID-19 directly affects 17.7% 
and 21.8% of the global and LMIC popula-
tions, respectively.3 This paper aims to provide 
a descriptive account of India’s response to the 
pandemic in the initial months, that is, from 
17 January (when it issued its first travel advi-
sory for COVID-19) until 20 April (initiation of 
graded relaxation of the nationwide lockdown). 
We build the analysis on India’s LMIC context.
COLLATION OF INFORMATION
Setting
India has a semifederal democratic govern-
ance system. The Constitution of India vests 
the responsibility of ‘health’ in its states, and 
that of preventing the spread of infectious 
diseases from one state to another concur-
rently with the Government of India (GoI) 
and the states.6
The GRID COVID-19 Study Group
Our group (n=55) has members located 
across 40 institutions in India (21 of 28 
states and 3 of 8 union territories (UTs). 
These include teaching faculty (n=47) 
and residents (n=3) in departments of 
community medicine in medical schools, 
full- time public health researchers (n=3), 
monitoring and evaluation expert (n=1), 
Summary box
 ► Low- and- middle- income countries (LMICs), where 
85% of the world’s population reside, need context- 
relevant approaches.
 ► We analysed India’s (an LMIC) initial response to the 
pandemic (from 17 January to 20 April 2020).
 ► India’s variegated epidemiological, sociopolitical 
and systemic vulnerabilities make its pandemic re-
sponse complex.
 ► India could leverage pre- existing legislative provi-
sions to adopt a collective combat, with states taking 
the lead with support from the union government; 
the pre- emptive stringent nationwide lockdown had 
benefits as well as uncovered vulnerabilities.
 ► Insights from India’s initial response will help in re-
sponse preparedness and planning for future pan-
demics, especially in the LMIC context.
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and a pharmacoepidemiologist (n=1) in academic 
research organisations. The members were identified 
based on their engagement in COVID-19 pandemic 
containment in various capacities (as programme 
advisors, implementers, members of rapid response 
teams, researchers) in respective states/UTs and at 
the national level. The group kept track of COVID-19 
developments in respective and neighbouring states 
and UTs.
Data sources
The group members pooled government communica-
tions (eg, public orders, circulars, advisories, guidelines, 
press releases, updates on official websites), guidance 
documents from stakeholder constituencies (eg, profes-
sional associations, local authorities), and excerpts from 
leading national and local newspapers (on open- ended 
Google Forms), social media resources (‘MyGov Corona 
Newsdesk’ on the Telegram app) and relevant reports by 
sharing them to a common group created on WhatsApp 
(a popular social media app used on mobile devices). 
For data on cases (number of active cases, recovered/
discharged, deceased and migrated, at the national and 
state level), we archived information from the Ministry 
of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW;  mohfw. gov. in) 
every day between 22:00 and 23:59 India standard time to 
capture updated statistics.
Quality check and archiving
A group of nine coordinators provided oversight. Two 
coordinators (ArM and SB) curated the repository by 
removing duplicate documents and verifying authenticity 
through triangulation from multiple sources, including 
government documents and websites. Data were archived 
chronologically according to date and with labels for easy 
retrieval.
Synthesis and analysis
We designed a timeline of key events related to the 
pandemic in India by sequencing major government 
circulars and interventions. Between 21 and 26 April, 
the group members reviewed the repository of resources 
Figure 1 Study flow diagram. GRID, Generating Research Insights for Development.
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pooled and submitted 92 nominations for the most 
prominent initiatives by GoI and respective states/UTs in 
response to the pandemic during the study period. The 
members provided the source reference (as available) 
for the nominations they made. We did not reject any 
nomination; the coordinators validated each of these by 
reviewing the reference provided, searching for addi-
tional information on the internet and contacting the 
contributing member for clarification, if needed. Two 
coordinators (ArM and SB) carefully examined each 
nomination for its content, free- listed the phrases, and 
moved similar phrases together through discussion and 
mutual agreement. If the same initiative had been nomi-
nated multiple times, it was clubbed together. The two 
coordinators placed the nominations under relevant 
themes according to the WHO 2018 updated checklist for 
pandemic influenza risk and impact management.7 They 
paraphrased the nominations for clarity and brevity in 
track changes mode to trace the edits. The coordinators 
(MB, PC, PK, BR, SS, AS, MKS) independently reviewed 
the paraphrasing and theme assignment and made edit 
suggestions as and where necessary. Subsequently, over 
sessions of video meetings, all the coordinators resolved 
the suggestions through discussion, review of references 
and consensus. The list was circulated back to the study 
group, and suggestions were addressed by reiterating the 
process before finalising for approval. Finally, 87 initi-
atives were identified, of which 44 were at the national 
and 43 at the state level. Critical analyses of the inter-
ventions and developments regarding combat of the 
pandemic in the initial months were done using a SWOT 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) frame-
work through multiple rounds of feedback and editing 
to build consensus using the process described above. 
Figure 1 shows the flow diagram of the study.
INDIA’S INITIAL RESPONSE
Figure 2 presents a timeline of events, and box 1 provides 
a list of initiatives undertaken in the initial 3 months by 
the union, and states and UTs to combat the pandemic.
Preparing for an emergency
India reported the first three cases between 30 January and 
2 February—all returnees from Hubei Province, China. 
After a hiatus through February, cases started increasing 
from early March. Starting mid- January (17–21 January) 
through mid- March, India issued advisories against non- 
essential international travel and suspended pre- existing 
visas in a graded manner at its ports of entry: air, sea and 
land.8 By mid- March, states/UTs had started prohibiting 
mass gatherings and levying curfew in selected areas. The 
public were advised to observe social distancing, hand 
hygiene and cough etiquettes, and to stay at home. On 
22 March, GoI called for a voluntary citizens’ curfew. The 
country went under a 21- day complete lockdown on 25 
March (with just about 3.5 hours’ notice on 24 March).9 
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Box 1 List of some of the prominent initiatives/interventions in India in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (based on WHO 
2018 checklist for pandemic influenza risk and impact management)7
1. Preparing for an emergency.
1.1. Planning coordination and resources.
 ► GoI constituted 11 empowered groups and a coordination group for pandemic response.
 ► States formed multidisciplinary taskforces and advisory panels.*
 ► GoI solicited public and private donations for PM’s National Relief Fund.
 ► GoI launched the PM CARES Fund—individuals, PSUs and corporates contributed funds.
 ► India proposed the creation of SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Fund to neighbouring nations.
1.2. Legal and policy issues.
 ► Epidemic Diseases Act, 1987 invoked—international travel suspended; states gained increased administrative power, started locking down before 
declaration of a nationwide lockdown.*
 ► Disaster Management Act, 2005 invoked—GoI declared the pandemic as a ‘national disaster’, increased fund access to states and UTs; nationwide 
lockdown implemented from 25 March.
 ► Section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 activated prohibiting public assembly of ≥4 people.*
 ► States drafted respective COVID-19 pandemic regulations.*
1.3. Ethical issues.
 ► ICMR released the national guidelines for ethics committees reviewing biomedical and health research during COVID-19 pandemic by second fort-
night of April 2020.
1.4. Risk communication and community engagement.
 ► Religious leaders, celebrities and social influencers engaged in social mobilisation.
 ► Caller tunes set in regional languages on prevention of SARS- CoV-2 and stigma.
 ► MOHFW, states released information materials and daily updates on COVID-19 situation.
 ► MOHFW created a central repository of SOPs, guidelines and resources developed by it.
 ► MOHFW and state representatives conducted regular periodic press briefings; Press Information Bureau, GoI made media releases actively.
1.5. Points of entry.
 ► Airports: travel advisories issued against non- essential travel to high- risk countries (17 January); screening of passengers coming from high- risk 
countries scaled up (17 January); pre- existing visas suspended; universal screening initiated (4 March); mandatory 14- day quarantine on arrival (11 
March); Indian citizens evacuated from affected countries.
 ► Sea ports: in sync with International Health Regulations, 2005, the Ministry of Shipping issued advisories, quarantine and entry protocols (28 
January).
 ► Land checkpoints: immigration checkpoints with neighbouring countries shut down; cross- border passenger train and bus services, and border local 
markets suspended; those with influenza symptoms or travelling from afflicted countries quarantined.
1.6. Travel restrictions.
 ► International travel advisories issued against non- essential travel from January.
 ► By mid- March, most pre- existing visas suspended.
 ► International and domestic commercial flights prohibited.
 ► During nationwide lockdown, passenger trains suspended, mass movement restricted, and interstate and interdistrict borders* sealed.
2. Surveillance, investigations and assessment.
2.1. Laboratories.
 ► Testing scaled out from NIV to 51 ICMR centres, with additional 50 collection centres (16 March).
 ► Private labs roped in; existing facilities upgraded.
 ► Sample collection kiosks and mobile COVID-19 testing vans set up.*
 ► ‘Made- in- India’ coronavirus testing kits released to the market (end of March).
2.2. Surveillance, outbreak investigation and monitoring.
 ► ICMR centres checked random samples (symptomatic but without travel history to outbreak zones) for community transmission between 15 and 29 
February (20 samples in total), and then from 16 March (each of the 51 centres tested 10 samples each week).
 ► ICMR estimated proportion of COVID-19 cases based on SARI and ILI sentinel surveillance.
 ► IDSP network leveraged for community- based surveillance.
 ► Testing criteria revised as per need for information and evolution of the pandemic.
 ► Private sector engaged for sentinel surveillance.
 ► Over- the- counter sales of cold and influenza medications monitored.
 ► Drones used for monitoring sanitisation, public movement and surveillance.*
 ► Call data records used to track COVID-19 clusters and those returning from ‘super- spreader’ events.*
 ► Citizens under home quarantine tracked with a tool, the ‘COVID-19 Alerting Tracking System’.*
 ► Mobile app released for reporting SARI by private providers.*
 ► Cluster containment strategies adopted to assess and counter risk.
 ► Village taskforce constituted to monitor and report COVID-19 cases and enforce lockdown.*
 ► Civil society organisations helped in identifying hotspots and in mitigating stigma.*
 ► Contact tracing and surveillance undertaken with engagement of community medicine experts and other personnel of medical colleges.*
Continued
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Box 1 Continued
2.3. Risk and severity assessment.
 ► Fever and influenza clinics set up at health facilities for risk assessment and triage.
 ► Active and passive surveillance intensified to identify geographical hotspots and suspects.
 ► Front- line workers conducted home visits to identify and inform individuals with comorbidities.*
 ► Rapid response teams constituted at national and state levels.
 ► Aarogya Setu mobile app launched for risk communication and tracking.15
 ► Released plan for graded relaxation of lockdown from 20 April using colour zoning (based on case load and case doubling rates) for surveillance and 
cluster containment strategies.
3. Health services and clinical management.
3.1. Health services.
 ► Health service continuity: ~US$2 billion emergency financial package for healthcare by GoI; free- of- cost testing and treatment for COVID-19 under 
the national universal health insurance scheme (‘PM JAY’); patients with chronic diseases given medicine refill stock for 3 months in advance;* home 
delivery of 1 month’s antituberculosis medicines*; amendment of telemedicine practice guidelines by GoI (24 March); attacks on HCWs engaged 
in COVID-19 response made promptly punishable under law*; PPE given to HCWs with a guidance plan on reuse*; rationing of HCWs engaged in 
COVID-19 care (stand- by staff, staff rotation).*
 ► Facilities: military hospitals engaged in preparing dedicated COVID-19 facilities, including ICUs; upgrading/modifying existing public hospitals and 
private hospitals as COVID-19 hospitals*; converting hotels, train coaches, sports stadiums, schools and so on into isolation/quarantine centres.*
 ► Personnel: additional healthcare personnel appointed on ad- hoc basis; release of advance/increased salaries for HCWs engaged in COVID-19 
response*; deployment of medical and paramedical students in screening, contact tracing and other services*; more than thirty thousand doctors 
(including retired, armed forces, private doctors) volunteered in response to GoI request; volunteers deputed in service delivery to elderly, differently 
abled, children and transgenders*; teams engaged in community activities provided with non- contact thermal screeners, masks and gloves*; acci-
dent insurance for HCWs and front- line workers involved in COVID-19 response.*
 ► Essential medicines, supplies and medical devices: India’s car makers helped to produce low- cost ventilators, masks and protective equipment; 
GoI with state government increased production and procurement of PPE, N95 masks and ventilators; Ministry of Textiles, MSMEs and workers’ 
(eg, weavers) association increased production of masks; price of masks (two- ply/three- ply surgical masks, N95) and hand sanitisers capped by 
Essential Commodities Act, 1955; early delivery of medicines and medical equipment was incentivised*; military transport fleet engaged in logistics 
support; civil society organisations helped in delivery of public healthcare/hygiene services.*
 ► Managing mortality: MOHFW released guidelines on dead body management. Guidelines issued for relatives and crematoria staff involved in final 
rites.*
3.2. Clinical management.
 ► Treatment and patient management: stock appraisal of drugs, PPE, critical care infrastructure and demand forecasting*; SOPs by apex medical 
centres and disseminated (through webinars and website) on various aspects of patient management (triage, testing, admission, discharge and so 
on); hospitals conducted mock drills for emergency response for handling COVID-19 cases*; hydroxychloroquine endorsed for COVID-19 prophylaxis 
and treatment and declared as Schedule H1 drug, thus restricting its over- the- counter sale; influenza desk made mandatory at all health facilities*; 
online trainings offered to increase clinical management capacity among personnel.
 ► Infection prevention and control: administrative procedures eased for procuring PPE, masks and sanitisers; work distribution and PPE matched to 
work profile*; SOPs prepared for hospital infection prevention and control—institutions adapt/prepare SOPs as per local needs; crowd management 
in hospitals to minimise mixing of those with and without COVID-19 risk profile.
4. Preventing illness in the community.
4.1. Non- pharmaceutical countermeasures.
 ► Personal interventions: IEC initiatives for spreading awareness on social distancing, hand hygiene, cough etiquettes, movement restriction and stig-
ma mitigation; incentive for self- registration and home quarantine for those returning from international travel; time- stamped route maps of each 
patient with COVID-19 released to the public (for general awareness)*; videos hosted on MOHFW website on making of masks at home, appropriate 
method for donning and removing them, and on hand hygiene; launch of self- assessment interactive apps for COVID-19*; governments posted 
guidance on preventive measures (dos and don’ts) on official web portals and in print and social media for wider dissemination.
 ► Community interventions: shutting down public places, for example, offices, schools, malls and so on; advisories for work- from- home and shelter- 
in- place; nationwide lockdown (from 25 March); release of prisoners to decongest jails*; waiving off school examinations*; wearing masks made 
mandatory during outings*; floor marking for social distancing in queues; hand sanitisers and thermal scanners at shop, residential society and 
office entrances.
5. Maintaining essential services and recovery.
5.1. Essential service continuity.
 ► GoI recommended states and UTs to use the State Disaster Response Fund for providing food and shelter to migrant workers during the lockdown 
period.
 ► Shrines volunteered to offer cooked meals and share costs incurred by government for surge.*
 ► RBI (India’s central regulatory bank) took initiatives to expand liquidity.
 ► GoI announced US$22.6 billion relief package for poor, rural and migrant population (Prime Minister’s Poor Welfare Scheme; PM GKY).
 ► Increased share and subsidies on rations distributed through the public distribution system.
 ► Disbursement of advance/increased pensions for retirees, differently abled, widows and elderly.*
 ► Subsistence amounts given to construction workers.*
Continued
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Surveillance, investigation and assessment
Community- based surveillance activities were scaled up 
across India by end of March. The number of testing and 
collection centres was increased, testing criteria were 
extended, and private laboratories were engaged. On 4 
April, free- of- cost testing and treatment for COVID-19 
was mandated under the national universal health 
insurance scheme (Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana), 
further expanding testing outreach.10 Geographical 
areas with higher number of cases were labelled as 
hotspots, and aggressive cluster containment strategies 
were adopted. Areas were earmarked as red (hotspots), 
yellow and green zones in descending order of case load; 
while stringent restrictions continued in the red zones, 
others were conditionally eased from 20 April.11 Some 
states extended the lockdown without relaxation.
Health services and clinical management
The GoI and state governments scaled up provisions 
for institutional quarantine and isolation centres and 
COVID-19 hospitals (beds with oxygen and critical care 
services). Ventilators and personal protection equipment 
were consigned from vendors in the country and abroad. 
Training of personnel in the care of COVID-19 suspects 
and patients was undertaken aggressively. A series of 
guidelines and standard operating procedures were 
released by the MOHFW, GoI and the country’s apex 
medical institutions (eg, All India Institute of Medical 
Sciences, New Delhi) and disseminated as webinars and 
video modules.12 13 Private providers and facilities were 
identified and mobilised for institutional surge prepared-
ness. Volunteering was solicited from healthcare profes-
sionals. Telemedicine guidelines were launched on 25 
March to facilitate access to medical consultations.14 The 
Aarogya Setu (Health Bridge) app was launched on 2 
April and made mandatory in offices and public places 
to enable dissemination of advisories, best practices and 
tracking.15
Preventing illness in the community
Non- pharmaceutical interventions were targeted at 
the individual and the community. These were mainly 
through public health communication and implemen-
tation of social distancing, movement restriction and 
wearing of mask in public places. The lockdown limited 
people’s exposure to the virus.
Maintaining essential services and efforts for recovery from 
the pandemic
Consultations between the union and states prior to 
and during the lockdown were undertaken for strin-
gent implementation of restrictions while minimising 
disruption of essential goods and services. The Ministry 
of Home Affairs, GoI issued guidelines on 24 and 25 
March specifying the services that were exempt from the 
lockdown restrictions.9 In addition to health and police 
services, the list included regulated financial markets, 
and staff engaged in petroleum products, supply chain, 
cargo, customs, mining, forest, and social welfare depart-
ment, and others.9 Interventions to mitigate hardship 
Box 1 Continued
 ► Doorstep delivery of daily essentials (eg, groceries, vegetables, medicines) during lockdown.*
 ► Movement restriction waivers provided for limited hours of the day to buy essentials.*
 ► Internet data purchase allowance for students to continue online classes.*
 ► Vigilance tightened against price inflation and hoarding/black marketing of general commodities.
 ► Mobile automated teller machines parked near residential apartments.*
5.2. Recovery.
 ► Helplines set up and online counselling sessions organised for mental health conditions.
 ► Relief camps and helpline numbers for stranded migrants with help from civil society organisations.
 ► RBI advises banks to offer 3- month moratorium on loan instalment payments by individuals.
6. Research and development.
 ► Indian firms initiate work on ‘vaccine candidates’, some along with international collaborations.
 ► Request for proposals on COVID-19- related research from major research councils and institutions.
 ► Major research labs engaged in diagnosis, vaccine development and disease prediction modelling.
 ► Biotechnology/bioengineering labs suggested low- cost ventilators and equipment for surge.
 ► Leading scientific journals in India worked towards coming up with special issues on COVID-19.
 ► Approval and market release of first Made- in- India COVID-19 testing kit (25 March).
 ► India joined WHO Solidarity Trial to develop therapy for COVID-19 (27 March).
 ► Private hospitals permitted to initiate trials with convalescent plasma therapy (19 April).
 ► ICMR constituted thematic taskforces for exploring research avenues.
*Initiative undertaken by some states/UTs.
GoI, Government of India; HCWs, healthcare workers; ICMR, Indian Council of Medical Research; ICU, intensive care unit; IDSP, Integrated Disease Surveillance 
Programme; IEC, Information, education and communication; ILI, Influenza- like illness; MOHFW, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; MSMEs, micro small and medium 
enterprises; NIV, National Institute of Virology, Pune; PM, Prime Minister; PM CARES, Prime Minister Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations; PM GKY, 
Pradhan Mantri Gareeb Kalyan Yojana; PM JAY, Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana; PPE, personal protective equipment; PSUs, public sector undertakings; RBI, Reserve 
Bank of India; SAARC, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; SARI, severe acute respiratory infections; SOPs, standard operating procedures; UT, union 
territory.
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among the poor and vulnerable were introduced by the 
GoI and state governments.16
INSIGHTS
Understanding the Indian context for pandemic response
India presents a mix of inherent strengths and weaknesses 
in combating the pandemic (box 2). Thereupon, the 
COVID-19 pandemic uncovers some perceivable oppor-
tunities and threats. An appreciation of these facets will 
help the reader understand the context and its influence 
on India’s response.
Combating risk of importation of the virus
‘Nobody can be fully prepared to a pandemic’.1 India also 
could have benefited from even further pandemic response 
planning and preparedness. The country had its first case 
on 30 January. Between January and early March, India 
focused almost exclusively on minimising the risk of impor-
tation. In hindsight, it seems that aggressive surge prepar-
edness could also have been undertaken in the meanwhile 
(especially in February) given that the virus had originated 
from an immediate neighbouring country and that WHO 
had already declared it as a ‘Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern’ on 30 January.17 The graded border 
control approach using selective screening and travel 
restrictions in January to February, leading to universal 
screening, visa suspensions and mandatory quarantine in 
March, could not adequately counter the risk of importa-
tion. Moreover, relying on thermal scanning was not infal-
lible as several cases were afebrile/asymptomatic. Cases 
started increasing rapidly in early March. Containment and 
surge efforts followed subsequently (around mid- March). 
Box 2 Perceived strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the Indian context during the initial months of 
combating the COVID-19 pandemic (definitions adapted from WHO documents)26 27
Strengths: factors intrinsic to India that position it towards a strong performance against the COVID-19 pandemic.
 ► Governance: semifederal, democratic and decentralised governance; consultative decision- making processes (eg, taskforces); multiple channels of 
public communication; strong engagement with development partners.
 ► Existing legislative mechanisms (eg, the Epidemic Disease Act, 1897; the Indian Ports Act, 1908; the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; the Essential 
Services Maintenance Act, 1968; the Disaster Management Act, 2005): if invoked, these allow special administrative powers to the government.
 ► Programmatic outreach: allows targeted delivery of entitlements to the vulnerable (eg, the public distribution system for food security, zero- balance 
and minimal documentation bank accounts for direct cash transfer, social security schemes, commitment to universal health coverage and so on).
Weaknesses: factors intrinsic to India that impede performance and need change/investment.
 ► Fragile and chronically underfunded health system: poor infrastructure and tertiary care capacity; inconsistent supplies; data challenges (eg, quality, 
timeliness, adequacy); limited engagement of private sector; absent/inadequate health insurance cover.
 ► ‘Missing millions’ (the homeless migrants, illegal immigrants, people in humanitarian crises, disaster- ravaged groups): although not adequately 
assessed, the numbers are substantial.
 ► Limited institutional preparedness for managing pandemics: India has managed recent infectious disease outbreaks, but protocols (eg, for public 
health emergency management protocols, public–private collaboration, research engagements) are in evolution.
Opportunities: prospects in the current COVID-19 context that could be exploited for effective combat of COVID-19.
 ► A better understanding of SARS- CoV-2 and COVID-19: scientific evidence on disease management, prevention and containment is increasingly 
available from January 2020.
 ► Favourable age pyramid: only ~8.5% of India are over 60 years of age,majority are under 30. A young population may have a lower risk of mortality 
from COVID-19 and help in faster economic recovery.
 ► Indigenous capacity: India’s large pharma, research and development, and the information technology industry can contribute to global efforts 
(vaccine development, delivery, diplomacy).
 ► Wide reach of telecommunications and social media: makes risk communication faster and with outreach for public engagement.
 ► Availability of deployable health human resources: for example, community medicine and public health professionals for technical support, physi-
cians from the Indian system of medicine for primary care coverage, huge network of community- based workers (especially in states with weaker 
health infrastructure) for outreach, and private laboratories, hospitals and organisations for service scale- out; expansion of tertiary healthcare 
institutions in recent times.
Threats: elements in broader environment that could endanger/inhibit progress in the combat of COVID-19.
 ► Huge population size and LMIC context: India’s vast population, poor living and health access conditions, and heterogeneous epidemiological profile 
increase the risk of spike in COVID-19 cases and of overwhelming system capacity.
 ► Economic stagnation: growth of India’s economy has been slower, of late—could limit fiscal space for aggressive countermeasures against the 
pandemic.
 ► Limited surge capacity for testing and institutional care (eg, critical care experts, infrastructure, access, space for isolation); inadequate supply of 
PPE.
 ► Implementing prolonged restriction will impede essential services, lead to loss of livelihoods (job profiles inconducive to working from home; farmers 
must protect the spring harvest) and cause adverse economic impact. The strategy for exit from lockdown is complex.
 ► Sociobehavioural complexities: risk of some people flouting preventive directives, stigmatisation, misinformation and rumour mongering, violence 
against healthcare workers and police, hoarding of essentials (PPE, medicines, sanitisers, groceries) and upsurge in psychosocial health issues (eg, 
depression, alcohol withdrawal, domestic violence).
LMIC, low- income and middle- income country; PPE, personal protective equipment.
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Meanwhile, COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by WHO.17 
Worsening situations internationally, such as in Italy, UK 
and Iran, added to India’s anxiety.
Since mid- March, India has acted swiftly to stem the rising 
cases of COVID-19. Existing legislative provisions (prom-
inently the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and the Disaster 
Management Act, 2005) and semifederal governance struc-
ture provided due leverage. India thus mobilised resources 
and provided administrative flexibility to state governments 
to utilize the disaster funds, enabling contextual action. As 
a consequence, states could implement mass movement 
restrictions, access funds, mandate citizens into institu-
tional quarantine and isolation, and regulate industries 
(implement work- from- home advisories). Alongside, GoI 
suspended visas and declared a nationwide lockdown.
Experience with ‘pre-emptive’ nationwide lockdown
The first phase of the lockdown (25 March–14 April) 
in India was unlike any other country in scale, timing 
and stringency. The lockdown gave India time for surge 
preparedness especially in testing capacity and insti-
tutional healthcare provisions.18 People also accepted 
and supported the stringent restrictions (pandemic 
response may evoke strong support or protests in demo-
cratic settings). Prevention, containment, impact mitiga-
tion and recovery efforts gradually became concurrent. 
Administrative decision- making capacity was increasingly 
strengthened (up to subdistrict levels). To compensate 
for insufficient testing capacity, the country engaged its 
massive network of community- based workers and under-
took aggressive community- based surveillance, contact 
tracing and cluster containment strategies.19 Official 
channels of communication to stakeholders gradually 
became structured and consistent, allaying spread of 
misinformation. Meanwhile, aggressive media coverage 
increased public awareness.
In the absence of robust epidemiological data and 
amidst predictions of rapid increase in COVID-19 cases, 
India locked down ‘pre- emptively’ and ‘nation- wide’ at 
extremely short notice. The lockdown slowed down the 
spread of infection: the case doubling time (7- day moving 
average) on 25 March was 3.4 days and on 19 April was 
6.2 days; however, the number of cases kept increasing.20 
On 24 March, when India declared lockdown, it had 564 
cases and 10 deaths; on 20 April, when graded relaxation 
Box 3A Insights from India’s initial response (17 January–20 April) to combat the COVID-19 pandemic: strengths in India’s 
response
 ► Conspicuous political commitment: union and state governments and political parties mostly came together supporting one another during the crisis.
 ► Visa restrictions: India experienced limited importation from countries for which travel advisories were restrictive. India suspended most of its ex-
isting visas from 15 March.28
 ► Initial engagements: stakeholder constituencies (governments, private sector (profit, non- profit), civil society, communities and individuals) were 
responsive to the COVID-19 scare despite the delay during the earliest months (January–February) and instituted preventive measures in support 
of one another.
 ► Legislative frameworks enabled administrative leadership: invocation of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (on 11 March) and the Disaster Management 
Act, 2005 (on 14 March) allowed further administrative power and fund access to GoI and state governments. Support for nationwide lockdown 
shows collective leadership from stakeholder constituencies.
 ► Community- based surveillance: in the absence of adequate testing resources, India scaled up its house- to- house mass surveillance and sensitisa-
tion efforts through syndromic approaches, leveraging existing integrated surveillance systems and its large network of front- line workers.
 ► Programme outreach helped in targeting the entitlements: pre- existing social welfare programmes, internet banking services and Jan Dhan bank 
accounts (zero- balance bank accounts for the poor) facilitated disbursement of entitlements to targeted beneficiaries with speed and minimal 
pilferage.23
 ► ICMR supported GoI with setting up the network of labs for testing and serosurveillance, and by setting up thematic taskforces (to plan, implement 
and monitor guidelines). It also advised on treatment protocols based on upcoming local evidence.
 ► States have the potential to innovate; the chance of success increases with prior experience in managing disasters and outbreaks: while GoI facili-
tated the combat of the pandemic, states rapidly innovated, co- learnt and co- adapted various innovations with local effectiveness. Examples include 
the following:
 – Aggressive community containment after an outbreak (Bhilwara model, Rajasthan).
 – Convergence in an urban setting (Vishakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh).
 – Community- based surveillance with high coverage despite difficult mountainous terrain (the Himachal Pradesh experience of engaging front- line 
health workers, and the Jammu and Kashmir experience of leveraging technology).
 – The ethnic tribal communities in the North- East demonstrated how community vigilance and local systems of governance could coexist with 
formal epidemiological surveillance.
 – Odisha, one of the most resource- constrained and disaster- ravaged states in India, emerged as a ‘first mover’ in pandemic preparedness with 
its adeptness at managing natural disasters.
 – Kerala was able to ‘bend the curve’ (number recovered > number tested positive each day; Kerala model) through system- wide effort across a 
strong health system; the state has successfully combated the Nipah virus outbreak and a severe flood in the recent past.
 ► Engagement of district administration with local medical colleges for patient care and surveillance guidance (in some districts): this helped in 
techno- administrative convergence with contextualisation and in the mobilisation of human resources.
ICMR, Indian Council of Medical Research; GoI, Government of India.
GRID COVID-19 Study Group. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e003416. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003416 9
BMJ Global Health
was allowed, there were 17 656 cases and 559 deaths.12 
By 20 April, cases had been identified in 31 of 36 states 
and UTs and in 402 of 718 districts.21 Twenty districts 
accounted for over half the cases and two- thirds deaths—
these were among the most urbanised, affluent and indus-
trialised districts in the country.21 States and UTs showed 
variegated epidemiological curves (online supplemental 
figure 1A and B).
Contextual opportunities, for example, a relatively 
young population, accruing global understanding of the 
virus and the disease, and capacity for generating indige-
nous research evidence, remained underutilised as India 
went into a very stringent lockdown. The lockdown uncov-
ered vulnerabilities and triggered cascading effects across 
sectors and industries.22 The economy which was already 
ailing got further disrupted. The impact was highest at 
the ‘base of the pyramid’ (lowest socioeconomic strata) 
of the Indian society. People lost jobs and livelihood; 
reports of hardship, stress, anxiety and domestic violence 
came up. GoI and state governments rolled out initiatives 
to mitigate hardship among the vulnerable using pre- 
existing institutional mechanisms and programmatic 
outreach (eg, validated bank accounts for direct benefit 
transfer, network of public distribution system for food 
security, and others).23 They were assured of food and 
shelter. Nevertheless, the initiatives were inadequate to 
check reverse migration. Millions of workers migrated 
back home in the absence of any source of continued 
livelihood. The ‘reverse migration’ was frequently on 
foot and in overcrowded conveyances, thus threatening 
to push the virus deeper into rural India where pandemic 
preparedness was further weak.24 Given its ramifications 
and potentially long- term impact (including that related 
to stigma), strategising exit from the lockdown and 
subsequent recovery of communities from the pandemic 
was challenging.
Critical analyses for practice and preparedness
Given the dynamicity of India’s response, our current 
account may be non- exhaustive, but captures information 
Box 3B Insights from India’s initial response (17 January–20 April) to combat the COVID-19 pandemic: facets for further 
strengthening
Aspects specific to the COVID-19 pandemic.
 ► Countering risk of importation: India’s graded checks at airports, sea ports and land borders (January–March 2020) varied in stringency, criteria and 
timing. Universal screening and mandatory quarantine at airport arrivals were initiated late (in March). Just 19% of air passengers arriving between 
17 January and 23 March could be screened.29 Some passengers dodged advisories (self- declaration of symptoms, mandatory self- quarantine).
 ► Surge preparedness: India had limited surge preparedness in February. Limited testing capacity (number and coverage), restrictive testing criteria 
and cautious engagement with private sector impeded initial ‘test- isolate- treat’ efforts. Frequent modification of criteria for testing, quarantine and 
isolation required repeated unlearning and relearning. States were able to ramp up quarantine and isolation facilities but were relatively under- 
resourced for beds with oxygen and critical care support.
 ► Leveraging IT: despite its huge IT capacity and potential to generate indigenous big data, India could not adequately leverage technology for surveil-
lance or data analytics. The Aarogya Setu app (for tracking and public messaging) was criticised for gaps in data security.15
 ► Data integration, reconciliation and access: while the Indian Council of Medical Research and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare released 
data summaries on a daily basis from late March, the two initially had mismatch and needed reconciliation. The National Centre for Disease Control 
could not publish its weekly outbreak reports (from routine influenza syndromic surveillance) since February 2020.30 Validated multi- jurisdictional 
and sectoral information was unavailable and impeded research.
 ► Preventing potential super- spreader events: during the pandemic, outbreaks were linked to mass congregations that had been organised in violation 
of administrative restrictions. Contact tracing and isolation- quarantine activities had to be surged up impromptu and sustained thereafter but not all 
attendees could be traced back to the community.
 ► Quality of quarantine and isolation facilities: India’s quarantine facilities were criticised for lack of civic amenities and hygiene and for overcrowd-
ing.31 Some people resisted/escaped institutional quarantine- isolation; family members were anxious.32
 ► Lockdown: The ‘pre- emptive’ nationwide lockdown implicated fiscal ‘sacrifice’ and collateral impact (impaired routine health services, loss of 
livelihoods, massive reverse migration, mental health challenges). ‘Cash injections’ by the government to mitigate hardship were inevitable yet 
inadequate.
 ► Managing the ‘infodemic’: information overload (both correct and wrong), media attention, wide access to social media and deep penetration of 
tele- networks enabled fast dissemination. Alongside increasing awareness, public anxiety, stigmatisation and rumour mongering were also seen.
Aspects that go beyond the COVID-19 pandemic.
 ► Building on experience: India’s initial response to COVID-19 reiterates gaps it witnessed during the 2009 H1N1 (swine influenza) pandemic, that 
is, screening limited to major airports, urban- centric approach, limited diagnostic centres, lack of intensive care capacity and access.33 India 
needs proactive preparedness given recent outbreaks (eg, Nipah and Zika virus diseases, acute encephalitis syndrome). India’s Influenza Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan is of 2009; the December 2019 version is awaited in the public domain.
 ► Decision- making for public health action: committees constituted initially for the pandemic were led by experts beyond epidemiology and public 
health disciplines. Decisions were inconsistently based on evidence. Having an exclusive public health cadre could have made processes more 
efficient.
 ► Gaps in the health sector cannot be corrected rapidly: India’s health system has traditionally been underfunded year- on- year (allocation in 2019–
2020 annual union budget ~1.4% of gross domestic product).
IT, information technology.
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from across the country. Some of the approaches under-
taken by India seemed to have worked out in favour, while 
some needed better planning. We have summarised the 
insights from India’s response to the pandemic in the 
initial months in box 3A and B.
CONCLUSION
Within the initial few months, India could mobilise 
collective leadership and action, and secure public 
cooperation to undertake stringent combative measures 
against the pandemic. Apart from isolated incidents, 
there was minimal public resistance to the stringent 
nationwide movement restriction norms. Experience 
from India suggests that the LMIC context could be 
volatile, ambiguous and uncertain, and hence engaging 
with the community and other stakeholders is a critical 
facilitator. It also highlights that LMICs have complex 
socioepidemiological ecosystems with refractory vulner-
abilities that could compromise the sustainability and 
impact of stringent measures. Combative response to 
pandemics in such settings is likely to be improvisatory 
and broad- based (less precise) in the absence of a struc-
tured pandemic response plan. Stringent measures must 
be carefully weighed against alternatives and undertaken 
with concurrent mitigation and recovery initiatives. A 
contextualised and updated pandemic response plan 
with dynamic decision support systems could help in 
ensuring timely and structured response to national and 
international epidemiological triggers (scarce resources 
need efficient planning). Unfortunately, most LMICs 
either do not have a national plan for pandemic prepar-
edness and risk management or have one that has not 
been updated recently.25 COVID-19 pandemic combat 
strategies and experience vary worldwide. India is rela-
tively better resourced as compared with other LMICs 
in several aspects, and hence some of the Indian experi-
ence may not be readily extrapolatable to other LMICs. 
Nevertheless, India shares several challenges and vulner-
abilities typical of LMICs (eg, high population, resource 
constraints, socioeconomic milieu). Going forward, 
countries and especially LMICs (including India) will 
find the Indian experience variously relatable for plan-
ning response against the current and future pandemics, 
despite resource inconsistencies, while also appreciating 
that each country has its unique contextual strengths and 
weaknesses to account for and leverage.
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